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I. INTRODUCTION
nternational trade has boomed since World War II.' Ideally,
international trade promotes specialization, which lowers costs
as countries become more efficient in their production.2
However, trade barriers, including antidumping duty imposition,3
impede this system. In the United States, the United States
International Trade and Global Commerce, Bus. & ECON. RES. ADVISOR,
Spring 2006-Winter 2007, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/issue7/trade.html (last updated Dec.
2015).
2 Id. When one country is more efficient at producing a product than
another country (as was the scenario in the text), the former country is said to
have an absolute advantage. For more about absolute advantage and its related
counterpart, comparative advantage, see generally Jonathon Eaton & Samuel
Kortum, Putting Ricardo to Work, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 65 (2012).
3 Trade barriers include tariffs, licenses, import quotas, voluntary export
restraints, and local content requirements. Brent Radcliffe, The Basics of Tariffs
and Trade Barriers, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/tariff-trade-barrier-
basics.asp (last visited July 2, 2015). All of these barriers tack on costs for
exporters.
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Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC), pursuant to the Tariff Act
of 1930,4 investigate producer/exporters of foreign countries and
decide whether to impose this particular trade barrier-
antidumping duties. These duties are a country's reaction to
dumping, a term of art used to describe a situation when a
producer exports a product at a price lower than the normal value.5
By using unfair calculating methodologies, particularly zeroing,
the United States has found dumping and imposed antidumping
duties more often than any other World Trade Organization
(WTO) member.6 In order to comply with its WTO obligations,
specifically as they pertain to the WTO's antidumping agreement,
the United States must amend the Tariff Act of 1930. In particular,
the United States must eliminate zeroing as a potential mechanism
for calculating dumping margins. To do so, the Tariff Act of 1930
must be amended to remove any ambiguity and disallow zeroing
entirely.
In the past decade, the DOC and ITC have subjected many
producers to dumping investigations. As a result, producers were
forced to pay higher import duties in order to get their items into
the United States. Higher import duties, in turn, hurt American
consumers by driving up the price of goods and hurt American
producers by driving up costs for those producers who use foreign
intermediary products. To better understand why Americans
should care about these investigations, consider a recent case
involving the solar panel industry.
One of the more current dumping investigations involves
solar panel materials and components from Taiwan and China.7
4 19 U.S.C. ch. 4 (2012).
Brink Lindsey & Dan Ikenson, Antidumping 101: The Devilish Details of
"Unfair Trade" Law, CATO INST., TRADE POL'Y ANALYSIS, No. 20, at 35 (Nov.
21, 2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpaltpa-020.pdf.
6 Dan Ikenson, U.S. Abides Global Trade Rules... Just Ignore The Steel
Protectionism, Antidumping Abuse, WTO Violations, Etc., FORBES (July 16,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ danikenson/2014/07/16/u-s-abides-global-
trade-rules-j ust-ignore-the-steel-protectionism-antidumping-abuse-wto-
violation s-etc/.
7 Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China and
Taiwan; Scheduling of the Final Phase of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Duty Investigations, 79 Fed. Reg. 164, 50696-98 (Aug. 25, 2014),
available at
http://www.usitc.gov/trade remedy/731 ad 701_cvd/investigations/2014/Cryst
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The Oregon-based company, SolarWorld, requested a DOC
investigation in December 2013 regarding these materials and
components. 8 When the final phase of the investigation concluded,
the DOC and ITC determined that the materials and components
had been dumped and materially injured the United States
industry.9 The DOC found antidumping margins between 26.71
and 165.04 percent for Chinese imports ° and 11.45 and 27.55
percent for Taiwanese imports." With solar panel imports from
Taiwan and China valued at $657 million and $1.5 billion,
respectively, 12 it is undeniable that domestic companies will feel
the effect of the antidumping duties via increased prices.
While applauded as protecting domestic producers, 3 the
antidumping duties hurt American consumers and producers
alike. Since approximately half of all imported products are
alline%20Silicon%2oPhotovoltaic%2OProducts%20from%2oChina%20and%2
OTaiwan/Final/fr itc finalscheduling.pdf. To learn more about China's
involvement in the global solar panel industry and America's solar panel
industry, see generally Planet Money: How Solar Got Cheap, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/
2015/04/10/398811199/episode-616-how-solar-got-cheap.
8 Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China and
Taiwan; Scheduling of the Final Phase of Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Duty Investigations, supra note 7.
1 Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 4519, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-511, 731-TA-1246-1247 (Final)
(Feb. 2015), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_7 3 1/pub4519.pdf.
10 Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from the People's
Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 79
Fed. Reg. 246, 76970, 76973 (Dec. 23, 2014), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-23/pdf/2014-30092 .pdf.
11 Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from Taiwan: Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 79 Fed. Reg. 246, 76966, 76969
(Dec. 23, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-
23/pdf/2014-30107.pdf.
12 REUTERS, China Condemns US Anti-Dumping Duties on Solar Imports,
INT'L Bus. TIMES (Jul. 28; 2014, 5:34 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/china-
condemns-us-anti-dumping-duties-solar-imports-16405 28.
13 Illegal Dumping Funds Secured to Protect Gulf Seafood, GULF SEAFOOD
INST. (Jul. 10, 2014), http://gulfseafoodnews.com/2014/07/10/illegal-dumping-
funds-secured-to-protect-gulf-seafood/. Referencing her involvement in
assisting the dumping investigation that led to antidumping duties being
imposed on foreign exporters of various seafood products, Louisiana Senator
Mary Landrieu claims to "punish those who cheat the market" and "protect and
support the Gulf's seafood industry." Id.
Vol. 28:1
int 'l Trade's Zero Sum Game
products used to create final goods by American producers, 14
imposing high duties on these intermediary products raises costs
for American producers.15 For instance, after the United States'
raw material industries requested that the DOC investigate foreign
raw material producers for dumping, the DOC imposed
antidumping duties. As a result, Dow Corning and Spartan Light
Metal Products saw their product costs increase to double the
world price 16 and triple their previous price,17 respectively.
These increased production costs shrink profits because
American producers must pay more for either the imported
intermediary products or the higher-priced domestic intermediary
products.1 8 Decreased producer profits means that American
producers are forced to halt investment and job growth. 19 This
scenario incentivizes American producers to move their operations
out of the United States to avoid such increased costs, which
eliminates many American jobs and makes the United States a less
attractive country for investors and companies alike.20
Additionally, as production costs rise, the cost consumers pay for
the product also rises. Further, the obvious paradox of imposing
unfair duties to protect domestic producers from unfair dumping
is not lost among other WTO members; this ironic treatment only
14 Cato Institute, U.S. Antidumping Rules Kill American Jobs 0:05-0:20,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD9vK5bCS7I.
,5 Id. at 0:30-0:54. This introduces the issue of antidumping duties' effect
on downstream markets. This topic, though markedly important, is not
thoroughly addressed in this Article. For more information about the impact of
antidumping duties on downstream markets, see generally Daniel Ikenson,
Economic Self-Flagellation: How U.S. Antidumping Policy Subverts the
National Export Initiative, CATO INST., 46 TRADE POL'Y ANALYSIS, No. 46
(May 31, 2011) (arguing that the National Export Initiative proposed by
President Obama in 2010 must include antidumping reform, particularly reform
in those areas that affect downstream firms).
16 Cato Institute, supra note 14, at 1:00-1:17 (explaining that Dow Corning,
a producer of silicones used in solar panels, pays double the world price for
silicone metal, which is needed to produce silicones, due to antidumping duties).
17 Id. at 1:45-2:30 (describing the predicament of Spartan Light Metal
Products, which produces engine parts with magnesium). Spartan was hit with
soaring product costs due to antidumping duties imposed upon magnesium from
China and Russia after the imposition of an investigation, which was prompted
by only one domestic producer. Id.
18 Id. at 0:30-0:55 (explaining that lower product costs translate to lower
prices for consumers and vice versa).
11 Id. at 0:30-0:54 (stating that domestic industry protection is the intended
result).
20 Id. at 3:10-3:30.
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further deteriorates the United States' relations with other
countries.2
This Article will begin by briefly explaining dumping,
dumping calculations, zeroing, and antidumping measures in Part
II. Part III will then detail the history of the DOC methodologies
used to calculate normal value in relation to dumping and its
margins. In Part IV, this Article will analyze the DOC's methods
to determine dumping and discuss the discrepancies between
United States dumping methodologies and WTO methodologies.
Part V will examine which specific sections of the Tariff Act of
1930 allow zeroing and how these sections should be amended.
Part VI will conclude by explaining the positive outcomes of such
amendments.
II. DUMPING CALCULATION METHODOLOGIES AND
ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
Throughout the past several decades, countries have used
antidumping measures to combat dumping that materially harms
domestic industries.2 "Dumping" is a term of art used to describe
a situation when a producer exports a product at a price lower than
the normal value.23 For example, suppose a producer sells rice
within its own country's borders for two dollars per pound, but
exports the rice to another country for one dollar per pound. The
producer is dumping because its in-country price of one dollar per
pound is higher than its export price of two dollars per pound. 4
21 See generally Ikenson, supra note 6 (describing how the United States
repeatedly violates the WTO's Antidumping Agreement and the negative
consequences that have resulted, specifically focusing on the South Korean Oil
Country Tubular Goods case); Robert Evans, WTO Faults U.S. over Duties on
Chinese, Indian Steel Goods, REUTERS (July 15, 2014),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/trade-wto-india-us-steel-
idINKBNOFJ1TT20140714 (reporting the WTO's decision that the United
States had violated its member obligations, in regard to its imposition of duties
on Chinese and Indian steel goods).
22 The United States established its first antidumping statutes in the 1890s,
beginning with the Wilson Tariff of 1894, which expanded Congress' battle
against industry monopolization to international trade. Douglas A. Irwin, IMF,
The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective 4, Working
Paper No. 05/31 (Feb. 2005).
23 Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 5, at 3.
24 Rice is a product that the United States has dumped, particularly in
Mexico. In 2000, Mexico, after determining that the United States practice of
dumping rice in its country had caused harm to its domestic industry, imposed
Vol. 28:1
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Dumping is a private party act, performed by a
manufacturer or seller .2  Due to its lack of government
involvement, the WTO does not regulate the action;2 6 instead, the
WTO regulates a country's subsequent imposition of antidumping
duties after a private party (or parties) has been found to have
injuriously dumped its product.27 Dumping only becomes unlawful
under domestic laws if the dumping creates an injury for the
domestic producer. Therefore, in the example above, if the country
exporting rice for one dollar per pound does not cause harm to the
importing country's domestic producers, the dumping cannot be
punished.28
Exporters may dump for a variety of reasons. For instance,
some exporters may dump to maximize profits. 29 That is, if an
exporter has a backlog of inventory that it was unable to sell in its
domestic market, it may export the product at a decreased price to
sell the inventory, thus increasing the exporter's revenue. On the
other hand, other exporters may dump to eliminate the
competition, known as predatory dumping. 1 Further, if an
exporter anticipates that a country it exports to may request the
exporting country to impose a voluntary export restraint 32 on the
a 10.18 percent antidumping tariff on all imports of United States rice into
Mexico. Kara M. Reynolds, Dumping on U.S. Farmers: Are There Biases in
Global Antidumping Regulations? 3 J. INT'L. AGRIC. TRADE & DEV. 135, 136
(2007). The tariff caused exports of United States rice to Mexico to fall by
approximately ten percent. Id.
25 Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 5, at 3.
21 Understanding the WTO - Anti-Dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards:
Contingencies, Etc., WTO,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited
July 2, 2015).
27 Id. (explaining that the WTO is concerned with a country's reaction to
dumping, not the act itself).
28 Dumping, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dumping.asp (last visited July 2, 2015).
29 Wilfred J. Ethier, Dumping, 90 J. POL. ECON. 487, 488 (1982).
30 Nitisha Monopoly, Equilibrium Under Dumping (with diagram), ECON.
DISCUSSION, http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/monopoly/equilibrium-
under-dumping-with-diagram/3745 (last visited July 2, 2015).
3 1 Ethier, supra note 29; see also Predatory Dumping, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/termslp/predatorydumping.asp (last visited July
2, 2015) (providing a basic definition and example of predatory dumping).
However, predatory dumping tends to be less common and, overall, a rare
occurrence. Ethier, supra note 29, at 488-89.
32 A voluntary export restraint (VER) is a self-imposed restriction on the
quantity of goods that a country may export into another country. Voluntary
2015
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exporter's product, the exporter may dump its product into the
importing country before the importing country imposes the
restraint.33
A. Methods for Computing Dumping
Three basic methods are used to compute dumping under
19 U.S.C. section 1677f-1 and the WTO Antidumping Agreement
2.4.2: average-to-average transactions, 34 individual-to-individual
transactions, 35 and average-to-individual transactions .36 However,
the third method, comparing normal values to prices of individual
export transactions, should be the exception and used only if
''export prices ... differ significantly among different purchasers,
regions[,] or time periods. 3 7
When calculating normal value, such a value may be the
price of the product within the producer's own domestic market or
the price to produce the product plus profit.38 Normal value could
also be the price of a similar product in the producer's domestic
market.3 9 To determine the extent of dumping, known as the
dumping margin, the export price must be deducted from the
constructed normal value.40 This method of determining the
dumping margin is a grandfathered methodology, pre-dating the
Uruguay Round.41 To determine the weighted-average dumping
margin, the difference is then divided by the export price. If the
subtraction results in a negative number for the dumping margin,
Export Restraint (VER), INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/voluntary_export restraint.asp (last
visited July 2, 2015). A VER is intended to protect the importing country's
domestic producer while allowing the exporting country to continue to export.
Id. An exporting country may agree to a VER to avoid harsher punishments. Id.
11 James E. Anderson, Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 65, 65, 67-68 (1992).
34 Infra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
31 Infra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
36 Infra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
37 Infra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
38 Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 5, at 3.
39 Id.
40 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B); Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 5, at 3.
41 Daniel Porter & Ross Bidlingmaier, Targeted Dumping: The Next
Frontier in Trade Remedy Litigation, 21 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 485, 486
(2013).
12 Lindsey & Ikenson, supra note 5, at 3.
Vol. 28:1
Int'l Trade's Zero Sum Game
division by the export price does not occur.43 If the relevant agency
within a country determines that dumping has occurred at a high
enough level44 and has harmed the domestic industry, antidumping
measures are authorized.45
B. Antidumping Measures
Antidumping measures are measures taken to offset the
harm on domestic industries that the lower prices cause because
selling below cost is considered an unfair trade practice; thus,
antidumping measures tend to materialize as increased import
duties.46 When trade practices are truly unfair, the WTO
Agreements, which are otherwise constructed to reduce trade
barriers, allow countries to raise duties.47
In the United States, the DOC determines if dumping has
occurred.48 The ITC then determines if the dumping resulted in a
material injury or retardation to the industry or threatens to do
so.49 If both of these agencies make these determinations, the
United States is permitted to impose antidumping measures.50
The DOC Secretary issues the antidumping order, and the
United States Customs Service enforces the order5' by collecting
the duties.5 2 However, if either the DOC or the ITC do not find
dumping or material injury, retardation to the industry, or threat
43 Id.
44 If dumping is de minimis, it should be disregarded. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d
(a)(4). "[A] weighted average dumping margin is de minimis if the administering
authority determines that it is less than 2 percent ad valorem or the equivalent
specific rate for the subject merchandise." 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3).
41 Understanding the WTO - Anti-Dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards:
Contingencies, Etc., supra note 26.
46 Id. (explaining that antidumping measures, subsidies, and safeguards are
the exception to the WTO's general understanding of the uniform application
of tariffs).
47 Id.
48 Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations,
USITC, http://www.usitc.gov/press-room/usad.htm (last visited July 2, 2015).
41 Id. (adding that the ITC must halt investigation of "negligible" imports
as well).
10 Id. (emphasizing that an investigation must be terminated at the
preliminary or final stage if the ITC's findings are negative or negligible).
51 Id.
52 Priority Trade Issue: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/adcvd
(last visited July 2, 2015).
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thereof, respectively, the DOC and the ITC must halt all
investigations pertaining to the case.53
C. Trade Examples to Demonstrate Dumping,
No Dumping, and Zeroing
1. An Instance of Genuine Dumping
If a producer in Country A, the exporting country, sells
bananas on three different occasions in its domestic market,
Country A, at 56, 83, and 61, but sells bananas in Country B for
17, 14, and 11, then the producer has dumped the bananas into
Country B. Country B may retaliate by imposing antidumping
duties on imports of bananas from Country A. The chart below
illustrates this example:
Occasion 1
Occasion 2
Occasion 3
AVERAGE
Normal
Value of
Bananas
(Country
A)
56
83
61
66.67
CHART A
Export
Price of
Bananas
(Country
B)
17
14
11
14
Difference
Between
Normal
Value and
Export Price
39
69
50
52.67
In the chart above, the weighted-average dumping margin
of banana sales into Country B is 3.92, which signals that the
Country A producer is dumping into Country B.
2. An Instance of No Dumping
However, compare the chart above with the chart below:
CHART B
3 Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations,
supra note 48.
Weighted-
Average
Dumping
Margin
2.29
4.93
4.55
3.92
116 Vol. 28:1
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Occasion 1
Occasion 2
Occasion 3
AVERAGE
Normal
Value of
Bananas
(Country
A)
56
83
61
66.67
Export
Price of
Bananas
(Country
B)
58
88
63
69.67
Difference
Between
Normal
Value and
Export Price
-2
-5
-2
-3
In Chart B, the weighted-average dumping margin of sales
of the bananas into Country B cannot be calculated because the
average difference between the normal value and the export price
is -3, which signals that the producer in Country A is not dumping
bananas into Country B. Instead, its average price in Country A
remains lower than the producer's price of exporting bananas in
Country B.
3. An Instance of a Disingenuous Dumping
Finding via Zeroing
By transforming Chart B into a zeroing scenario, the result
changes, as displayed below:
Occasion 1
Occasion 2
Occasion 3
AVERAGE
Normal
Value of
Bananas
(Country
A)
56
83
61
66.67
CHART C
Export
Price of
Bananas
(Country
B)
58
88
58
68
Difference
Between
Normal
Value and
Export Price
0
0
3
1
In Occasions One and Two of Chart C, the bananas are sold
at a lower price in the domestic market, Country A, than in
Country B, which results in a negative difference (i.e., a "negative
dumping margin"). While the banana exporter does dump in
Occasion 3, Occasions 1 and 2 would offset such minimal dumping
without zeroing. However, by replacing the negative differences
with zeroes, the producer appears to dump the bananas into
Weighted-
Average
Dumping
Margin
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Weighted-
Average
Dumping
Margin
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.02
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Country B (although it is at a de minimis level that would not
result in antidumping duties)." Therefore, the charts demonstrate
that the use of zeroing negative margins can easily result in a
disingenuous dumping finding.
By exploring the three different scenarios above, the
problem with zeroing and similar dumping calculation
methodologies becomes clear: by using these methods, dumping is
found when it should not be found. As a result, antidumping duties
are imposed when they should not be imposed, making the
imported product more expensive and hurting the economy - in
the United States and across the globe.
III.THE HISTORY OF THE METHODOLOGIES
In their infancy, antidumping provisions in the United
States were closely tied to antitrust laws and predatory pricing
concerns. However, over the years, the emphasis on predatory
pricing has evolved into a concern for broad protection of the
United States domestic industries.
Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act55 was the United
States' first attempt at battling the monopolization of domestic
industries.56 The Sherman Act prohibits trade restraints and
monopolization attempts. 7 While it was intended to encompass
trade restraints among all states in the United States and among
foreign nations, 8 in American Banana Co. v. United States Fruit
Co., the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act's territoriality
could not extend to injurious acts committed outside the United
States. s9 Over eighty years later, however, in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, the Court held that the Act did apply
extraterritorially if the foreign conduct "produce[d] some
54 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of
de minimis dumping).
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
56 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW THE GATT AFFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING
AND COUNTERVAILING-DUTY POLICY 16 (1994).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 16.
58 15 U.S.C. § 1.
59 213 U.S. 347 (1909), overruled by W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Intern., 493 U.S. 400 (1990). Another act meant to address
monopolization in international trade was the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICe, supra note 56, at 19. This act, codified in 15 U.S.C. § 8, failed
to extend extraterritorially. Id.
Vol. 28:1
Int'l Trade's Zero Sum Game
substantial effect in the United States. 60
The Antidumping Act of 1916,61 passed by the Wilson
administration,62 was the first law to extend antitrust laws to
importers. 3 The Antidumping Act of 1916 makes it illegal to
import goods, assist in their importation, or to sell imported goods
at a value that is "substantially less than the actual market value
or wholesale price '64 of the goods, provided that a person commits
the importation, assistance, and/or sale with "the intent of [either]
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, 65
preventing the domestic industry's establishment, or causing
monopolization of the domestic industry.66 The scienter element
necessary in the Antidumping Act of 1916 vanished in the
Antidumping Act of 192 1,67 making it easier to determine dumping
without needing to prove an intent to injure the domestic market.
While the Act was repealed a half century later, it forged the path
for today's antidumping law,68 the Tariff Act of 1930.69
The Tariff Act of 1930, specifically sections 731-739 under
Subtitle B of Title VII, controls antidumping cases brought in the
United States today.70 According to the Act, if a "kind of foreign
merchandise" is being sold, or is likely to be sold, in the United
States at "less than its fair value," and the ITC determines that a
60 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
61 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2012) (repealed December 3, 2004).
62 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 20.
63 Id. Dumping, however, has been a concern since 1791. UNIV. OF FORT
HARE, CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF DUMPING AND ANTIDUMPING ACTIONS,
available at
http://ufh.netd.ac.za/bitstream/1035 3/100/4/Zvidza%20thesis% 20ch2.pdf.
64 15 U.S.C. § 72.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (repealed July 26, 1979). This Act was also
criticized for being inconsistent with international norms. STAFF OF S. COMM.
ON FIN., 90ST CONG., THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921 AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE iii (Comm. Print 1968).
68 Irwin, supra note 22. In 1968, the Senate began to consider the issues with
the United States' antidumping provisions and their lack of compliance with
international norms. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 90ST CONG, supra note 67, at
4-9. In fact, on July 5, 1968, the United States Senate Committee on Finance
issued a critique, stating that the Antidumping Act of 1921 was not consistent
with the International Antidumping Code of the time, which was forged during
the Kennedy Round in Geneva. Id.
69 19 U.S.C. ch. 4.
70 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supre note 56, at 3.
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domestic industry is "materially injured" or "threatened with
material injury" or the establishment of a new domestic industry is
"materially retarded" due to the foreign imports, an antidumping
duty will be imposed, equivalent to the "amount equal to the
amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the
constructed export price) for the merchandise."'" In other words, if
the DOC determines that an exporter is dumping and the ITC
determines that such activity is causing injury, may cause injury,
or may seriously impair a potential industry, the DOC Secretary
may issue an order for the imposition of antidumping duties, and
the United States Customs Service will carry out the order.7 The
order affects "each exporter and producer individually
investigated," as well as "all exporters and producers not
individually investigated.. .73 Simply put, the duty reaches all
exporters who import a product like the product 74 that the DOC
Secretary includes in the order.
In 1995, the WTO was established as the successor to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime, with the
United States as one of its founding members. The organization's
primary objective is to ensure the free flow of international trade.76
By acceding to the WTO, the United States vowed to abide by all
of the WTO's various agreements. One such agreement, which
was included in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,77 is the
71 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)-(2).
71 Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations,
supra note 48.
73 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (d).
74 The term, "like product" means "a product which is identical, i.e., alike
in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a
product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration."
Infra note 78, at art. 2.6.
71 Member Information: United States and the WTO, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa-e.htm (last visited July 2,
2015). In 2015, the WTO celebrated its twentieth anniversary. Azev~do: WTO
marks 20 years of helping boost trade growth, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news 15_e/dgra0 lj an 15_e.htm (last visited
July 2, 2015). Director-General Roberto Azev~do noted that the WTO has
"made an important contribution to the global economy and to smoother trading
relations between nations." Id.
76 Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/who-we-are-e.htm (last visited
July 2, 2015).
17 See Understanding the WTO: Basics - The Uruguay Round, WTO,
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Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.78 Known as the
Antidumping Agreement, 7  this agreement outlines the
methodologies for calculating dumping,s° stating that dumping
occurs only if a product's export price is less than the comparable
price in the ordinary course of trade or less than the price in the
exporter's home country."1 The Antidumping Agreement was built
upon the GATT Tokyo Round Antidumping Agreement.82 The
United States implemented the Tokyo Round Antidumping
Agreement with amendments to the Tariff Act as part of the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979. 83 The Antidumping Agreement also built
upon the earlier Kennedy Round Antidumping Agreement;
however, the United States never followed this particular GATT
agreement."4
From the establishment of the WTO until February 2012,
Member States filed forty-four requests for consultation with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body regarding the United States'
antidumping activity; sixteen percent of those requests specifically
mentioned the act of zeroing as a violation.81 In all of the concluded
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited
July 2, 2015). The Uruguay Round's Final Act is recognized as the largest trade
negotiation. Id. The Uruguay Round began in 1986 and concluded in 1995. Id.
78 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1124 (1994) [hereinafter Antidumping
Agreement].
11 A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ursum-e.htm#fAgreement (last
visited July 2, 2015).
80 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 2.
81 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 2.1.
82 Antidumping: Technical Information, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adp..e/adp-infoe.htm (last visited July 2,
2015).
83 J. F. HORNBECK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH. SER.,
RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 5 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33743.pdf.
84 HORNBECK & COOPER, supra note 83.
85 Dispute Settlement: The Disputes - Disputes by Agreement, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-agreementsindex-e.htm
# (last visited July 2, 2015). The forty-four requests for consultation include:
DS49; DS63; DS89; DS99; DS136; DS162; DS179; DS184; DS206; DS217;
DS221; DS225; DS234; DS239; DS244; DS247; DS262; DS264; DS268; DS277;
2015
Loyola Consumer Law Review
cases involving zeroing s6 the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
found zeroing inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement,
specifically Articles 2.4,87 2.4.2,88 and 9.3.89 In each case, the panels
found that the United States needed to conform its measures to
meet the Antidumping Agreement provisions. 90 While the United
States has generally complied with WTO agreements and upheld
its member obligations, 91 WTO members express great concern
DS281; DS282; DS294; DS310; DS319; DS322; DS324; DS325; DS335; DS343;
DS344; DS345; DS346; DS350; DS368; DS379; DS382; DS383; DS402; DS404;
DS420; DS422; DS424; and DS488. Id. Those alleging zeroing as a particular
issue include: DS350; DS382; DS383; DS402; DS404; DS422; DS471; and DS488.
Id.
86 In DS471, a panel was composed, but the panel has not released its
report. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS471 - United States - Methodologies
and Their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China, WTO,
http://wto.org/englishltratop-e/dispu-e/casese/ds47 le.htm (last visited July 2,
2015).
87 Panel Report, United States: Anti-Dumping Administrative Reviews and
Other Measures Related to Imports of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WTO
Doc. WT/DS382/R (adopted June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report: Orange
Juice from Brazil]; Panel Report, United States: Anti-Dumping Measures on
Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam, WTO Doc. WT/DS404/R (adopted Sept. 2,
2011) [hereinafter Panel Report: Shrimp from Viet Nam].
88 Panel Report, United States: Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/R (adopted Feb. 19, 2009),
modified by Appellate Body Report, United States: Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 19,
2009) [hereinafter Panel Report-Report of the Appellate Body: Zeroing
Methodology]; See also Panel Report: Orange Juice from Brazil, supra note 87;
Panel Report, United States: Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail
Carrier Bags from Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS383/R (Feb. 18, 2010)
[hereinafter Panel Report: Carrier Bags from Thailand]; Panel Report, United
States: Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from
Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS402/R (Feb. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report:
Products from Korea]; Panel Report: Shrimp from Viet Nam, supra note 87;
Panel Report, United States: Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and
Diamond Sawblades from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS422/R (July 23, 2012)
[hereinafter Panel Report: Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China.
"9 Panel Report & Report of the Appellate Body: Zeroing Methodology,
supra note 88; See also Panel Report: Orange Juice from Brazil, supra note 87;
Panel Report: Shrimp from Viet Nam, supra note 87.
90 Panel Report & Report of the Appellate Body: Zeroing Methodology,
supra note 88; See also Panel Report: Orange Juice from Brazil, supra note 87;
Panel Report: Carrier Bags from Thailand, supra note 88; Panel Report:
Products from Korea, supra note 88; Panel Report: Shrimp from Viet Nam, supra
note 87; Panel Report: Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China, supra note
88.
"1 Trade Policy Review: United States of America 1:20-1:27; 3:18-3:38,
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over the DOC's practice of zeroing.92 In its review of the United
States' trade policies, the WTO listed the number of dumping
investigations conducted by the DOC and the outcome of those
investigations as one of two93 top concerns of fellow WTO
members. 4
On February 14, 2012, the DOC vowed to remove its
zeroing methodology from all dumping calculations.95 However,
instead of taking this action, the DOC continues to use zeroing to
increase the likelihood of a dumping finding.96 In particular, the
DOC uses zeroing in connection with its differential pricing
analysis. 97 Since the analysis was introduced in 2013, partially in
response to WTO decisions, it is estimated that approximately
eighty percent of all dumping calculations performed by the DOC
find a need for the differential pricing analysis.9" Of those eighty
percent, thirty percent find it necessary to apply zeroing. 99 This
practice only reaffirms the United States' refusal to entirely
eliminate its zeroing methodology, which unduly protects its own
industries.
IV.THE METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR DISCREPANCIES
Discrepancies between the Tariff Act of 1930 and the
WTO's Antidumping Agreement, as well as discrepancies between
United States laws and the United States' obligations as a WTO
WTO (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.wto.org/audio/tp407.mp3.
11 Id. at 7:48-8:14. Specifically, members were concerned about the
increase of antidumping investigations; these investigations have increased
largely due to the implementation of zeroing since zeroing allows for a positive
dumping finding when the unaltered data would not allow it. Id.
93 The Farm Bill and its violation of the WTO's no-subsidies agreements
was the other major concern. See Id. at 4:02-4:20.
94 Id. at 7:48-8:14.
91 Sungjoon Cho, A WTO Panel Openly Rejects the Appellate Body's
"Zeroing" Case Law, 12 AM. SOC'V OF INT'L INSIGHTS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/12/issue/3/wto-panel-openly-rejects-
appellate-bodys-zeroing-case-law.
96 Mary Ann McCleary, Differential Pricing - the New Targeting, CAPITAL
TRADE INC. (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.captrade.com/2 013/11/differential-
pricing-the-new-targeting/.
97 Id.
98 Mary Ann McCleary, Differential Pricing Analysis - One Year Later,
CAPITAL TRADE INC. (June 17, 2014),
http://www.captrade.com/2014/06/differential-pricing-analysis-one-year-later/.
99 Id.
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member, allow the DOC to continue to use zeroing. Unless these
discrepancies are resolved, the DOC may legally continue zeroing
indefinitely.
A. Differential Price Analysis and Zeroing
When the DOC identifies a pattern of what it calls "targeted
dumping,"'1 the DOC continues to use zeroing despite its
agreement with the WTO to comply with the Dispute Settlement
Body and Appellate Body recommendations to stop zeroing. 1 ' In
these cases, zeroing is still used as part of a differential pricing
analysis. °2 The DOC explains this seemingly paradoxical situation
by stating that, in targeted dumping situations, importers may
mask dumping by charging very high prices, thereby creating large
"o The DOC defines targeted dumping as "a pattern of significant
differences in the prices that importers charge in the [United States] to different
purchasers, in different regions, or during different periods." Henry B.
McFarland, The U.S. Department of Commerce's Approach to Targeted
Dumping: the Wrong Test and the Wrong Response 19 (June 25, 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459479.
101 In instances when the United States has been told by the Dispute
Settlement Body to change its policies in order to comply with its WTO
obligations, the United States has insisted that it has implemented changes or
that it is in the process of doing so. See, e.g., Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS350
- United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, WTO (Feb. 16 2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/casese/ds350_e.htm (providing
the United States' declaration in DS350 that it intends to "bring its measures
into conformity"); Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS382 - United States - Anti-
Dumping Administrative Reviews and Other Measures Related to Imports of
Certain Orange Juice from Brazil, WTO (Mar. 13 2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispuelcases elds382_e.htm (stating in
its "Implementation of adopted reports" section that the DOC was continuing to
work to change its calculation methodology); Dispute Settlement: Dispute
DS422 - United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond
Sawblades from China, WTO (June 5 2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases_e/ds42 2_e.htm (displaying
a disagreement between the United States and China in regard to the United
States' insistence that it had implemented the Dispute Settlement Body's
recommendations regarding its zeroing use and China's insistence that it had
not done so).
102 Differential Pricing Analysis; Request for Comments, 79 Fed. Reg. 90,
27620-23 (May 9, 2014), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/05/09/2014-10487/differential-
pricing-analysis-request-for-comments.
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negative margins on some transactions.10 3 These large negative
margins may then skew the numbers to create an appearance of no
dumping when dumping has occurred. Differential pricing
analysis is a response to this concern. However, this fear is
relatively unsupported because there are a number of reasonable
reasons why price patterns may fluctuate greatly; some examples
include the seasonality of the product, the volume that a particular
buyer buys, or regional demand."M The DOC's decision to continue
to use zeroing and the differential pricing analysis frustrates
foreign exporters and causes problems for domestic producers that
rely on foreign exports to do business in the United States. By
enlisting such controversial dumping calculation methods, the
DOC has managed, in many instances, to find dumping when
calculations used by other countries suggest that dumping should
not be found.
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit has
consistently upheld the DOC's use of zeroing in the past.105
However, in February 2012, the United States announced that it
would end its use of zeroing.0 6 By the end of 2012, the DOC ended
103 McFarland, supra note 100.
104 Id.
105 SKF USA Inc. v. U.S., 630 F. 3d 1365, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(upholding zeroing when used to calculate an exporter's weighted-average
dumping margins); Koyo Seiko Co. v. U.S., 551 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(upholding zeroing when used for a DOC sunset review); SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S.,
537 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding zeroing when used to calculate
weighted-average dumping margins); NSFK Ltd. v. U.S., 510 F.3d 1375, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding zeroing for administrative reviews); Corus Staal B V
v. U.S., 502 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding zeroing in a second
administrative review); Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding zeroing when used to calculate the weighted-
average dumping margin); Timken Co. v. U.S., 354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (upholding zeroing when used in a DOC administrative review).
106 Infra note 146. Six years prior, the United States vowed to end its use of
zeroing in calculating individual respondent's weighted-average dumping
margins in antidumping investigations when utilizing the average-to-average
comparison methodology. Letter from Kenneth J. Pierce & Matthew R. Nicely,
Counsel to Dep't. of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Gov't,
to David Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Import Admin., United States Dep't of
Commerce, (Apr. 5, 2006) available at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/zeroing/cmts/dft-zeroing-cmt.pdf. At
this time, many WTO members called for the United States to end all zeroing,
no matter the investigation type, which the United States failed to do. Id.
Member States urged the United States to do this in order to fully comply with
its WTO obligations. Id.
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its use of zeroing in regard to investigations. 7 Nonetheless, this
did not ease the controversy and frustration because the DOC
continued to use the zeroing methodology for all administrative
reviews,'0 which resulted in inconsistent outcomes, including a
more frequent dumping finding.
These administrative reviews operate differently from the
DOC's other mode of inquiry, investigations. Administrative
reviews allow for monthly opportunity notice, take sixteen to
eighteen months for the first review, twelve months for any
subsequent reviews, and require questionnaires of all firms
requested for review. 109 Most importantly, the DOC calculates
dumping using an average-to-individual transaction methodology
when conducting an administrative review."' This average-to-
individual transaction methodology lends to an increased dumping
finding because the average normal value is compared to a single
individual price."' On the other hand, investigations do not
include opportunity notices, usually take twelve months to
conduct, and require questionnaires only from firms selected by the
DOC." 2 Further, when conducting an investigation, the DOC
calculates dumping using the average-to-average methodology."1 3
Used for the first time in the 2013 Xanthan Gum cases in
China and Austria,"14 differential pricing analysis involves a test
rarely used in the antidumping arena: Cohen's d test.'15 Cohen's d
107 U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S., 621 F.3d 1351,1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
108 Dongbu Steel Co., Ltd. v. U.S., 635 F. 3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
109 INTL' TRADE ADMIN., CHAPTER 22: DIFFERENCES IN CONDUCTING
INVESTIGATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS OF AD ORDERS 10-12
(2009), available at
http://enforcement.trade.gov/admanual/2015/Chapter%202 2 %20Differences%
20Between%2OConducting%201nvestigations%20and%2OAdministrative%20
Reviews% 2 Oof%20AD% 2 0Orders.pdf.
110 Id. at 4.
l Porter & Bidlingmaier, supra note 41, at 486-87.
112 INTL' TRADE ADMIN., supra note 109, at 10.
"1 Id. at 3.
114 Xanthan Gum from Austria and China, USITC Pub. 4411, Inv. Nos.
731-TA-1202-03 (Final) (July 2013), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/701_731/pub4411.pdf. The DOC found
dumping, but the ITC determined that material injury or threat of material
injury did not exist pursuant to Austria's activity. Id. at 1. A threat of material
injury did exist pursuant to China's activity. Id.
"I McCleary, supra note 96.
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test measures the effect size between two groups. 1 6 Effect size is a
way of measuring the difference between groups. 7 By using
Cohen's d test, "the effect size ... when comparing the mean of one
sample to another" may be calculated." 8 In the case of dumping,
the DOC first compares prices between different kinds of sale price
groups, which are categorized by purchaser, region, and time
period (usually measured in quarters)." 9 If a company has a large
percentage of sales with high Cohen's d, meaning the effect is
large, 2 ° the DOC may apply zeroing 2' because that determination
may indicate a "significant pattern of price difference."' 22
For example,'23 a car manufacturer may sell a car for
$5,000, the normal value, in his home country. He may export ten
thousand cars for $10,000 per car to Country A in one transaction.
In a second transaction, however, he may export another ten
thousand cars for $3,000 per car to Country A. If those amounts
were averaged, the resulting average price would be $6,500 per car,
above the normal value in the car manufacturer's home country,
which means that the car manufacturer has not dumped his
product. However, using the Cohen's d ratio analysis, a ratio of
$10,000 to $3,000 will have a large enough effect size to raise a red
flag with the DOC. The DOC will then use zeroing to eliminate the
$10,000 per car price in its analysis. As a result, the DOC will find
dumping because the only price left, $3,000, is below the normal
value of $5,000.
One year after the implementation of this methodology, the
DOC has used the differential pricing analysis in 125 antidumping
116 Ian Walker, Null Hypothesis Testing and Effect Sizes, STATISTICS FOR
PSYCHOLOGY, http://staff.bath.ac.uk/pssiw/stats2/page2/page14/page14.html
(last visited July 2, 2015).
117 Robert Coe, It's the Effect Size, Stupid: What Effect Size Is and Why It
Is Important, UNIV. OF LEEDS (Sept. 25, 2002),
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/00002182.htm.
Il Daniel J. Denis, Understanding Cohen's d, BRYAN W. GRIFFIN'S WEB
(Oct. 18, 2012)
http://www.bwgriffin.com/gsu/courses/edur913 1/content/cohend Denis.pdf.
"I McCleary, supra note 98.
120 Carter Bowles, The Cohen's d Formula, TRENDING SIDEWAYS (July 10,
2014), http://trendingsideways.com/index.php/cohens-d-formula/.
1 McCleary, supra note 98.
122 McCleary, supra note 96.
123 Please note that this is an incredibly simplified hypothetical example. It
is meant only to give a rudimentary understanding of the Cohen's d ratio
concept as it relates to a zeroing analysis.
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proceedings.'24  In approximately thirty percent of those
proceedings, the DOC has included zeroing in its dumping
calculations. Consequently, within a fourteen-month period, the
DOC used zeroing, a methodology it previously vowed to
eliminate, to find dumping in thirty-seven cases.' As is obvious in
proceedings conducted mere months ago, the DOC continues to
use zeroing in order to find dumping so it may impose antidumping
duties and protect its domestic industries.
B. Discrepancies Between the Tariff Act and the WTOs
Antidumping Agreement
There are multiple strains of disharmony between the
United States Tariff Act of 1930 and the WTO's Antidumping
Agreement. In particular, the DOC's zeroing practice violates four
articles of the WTO's Antidumping Agreement: 2.4.2, 2.4, 9.3, and
9.5.
In Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement, the WTO
outlines how a Member State's governing authority should
determine dumping margins. It states that dumping margins
should be calculated "on the basis of a comparison of a weighted
average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all
comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal
value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis.' '26
The United States' use of zeroing is not in accordance with Article
2.4.4. The Article requires all transactions to be taken into account,
yet, zeroing explicitly disregards all transactions whose export
price is greater than its normal value. 127 This failure to consider all
transactions does not comply with Article 2.4.2's requirement to
compare "a weighted average normal value with a weighted
124 McCleary, supra note 96.
121 McCleary, supra note 98.
126 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
127 Appellate Body Report, United States: Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumber from Canada, 86, 117, WTO Doc. WT/DS264/ABIR
(adopted Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report: Lumber from
Canada] (explaining that the United States violated article 2.4.2. by zeroing);
Appellate Body Report, United States: Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, 138, WTO Doc. WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report: Zeroing and Sunset Reviews] (emphasizing that the
United States' zeroing procedures violate the WTO's Antidumping Agreement,
including specifically article 2.4.2).
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average value of all comparable export transactions. 1 28
In Article 2.4, the WTO urges that a fair comparison
between export price and normal value be made, stating:
Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits,
for differences which affect price comparability,
including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical
characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to affect price comparability. 9
Zeroing is inconsistent with Article 2.4's fair comparison
requirement because zeroing "'artificially inflates the magnitude of
dumping...'"1'°
Article 9.3 mandates that the "amount of the anti-dumping
duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under
Article 2."'131 According to the Appellate Body, this duty
determination should take into account "all sales made by the
exporter or foreign producer, calculated according to the margin of
dumping established for that exporter or foreign producer without
zeroing."'32 Because zeroing does not take into account all sales in
determining its antidumping margin, and therefore the
determination of the antidumping duty is flawed, the DOC's use
of zeroing fails Article 9.3.
In Article 9.5, the WTO requires investigating authorities
within Member States to "promptly carry out a review for the
purpose of determining individual margins of dumping" for any
exporters that did not ship the product subject to antidumping
duties during the period of the Member State's investigating
body's investigation.'33 Similarly to Article 9.3, any use of zeroing
to determine the individual margins of dumping violates Article
128 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 2.4.2.
129 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 2.4.
130 Appellate Body Report: Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, supra note 12 7, at
22 (quoting Appellate Body Report: Lumber from Canada, supra note 127, at
86).
'"' Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 9.3.
132 Appellate Body Report: Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, supra note 12 7, at
156 (emphasis in original).
133 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 9.5.
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C. Discrepancies Between United States Law and United States'
WTO Obligations
In the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the United States
legislative branch stated that DOC actions are not governed by
WTO decisions.1 35 Specifically, URAA Section 102(a)(1) states that
any portion of the Uruguay Round Agreements that "is
inconsistent with any law of the United States" is without effect. 3 6
Further, the Statement of Administrative Action, which
accompanies the URAA, declares that in any instance of conflict
between United States law and WTO obligations, United States
law takes precedence.1 37 This lack of desire to comply with the
WTO's antidumping agreement does not align with the United
States' WTO Member State responsibilities, which include the
responsibility to abide by all WTO agreements. Therefore, as a
WTO member, the United States has an obligation to uphold its
agreements, 38 including the antidumping agreement. Otherwise,
the United States' membership status is without meaning. Further,
the United States has an incentive to abide by its international
obligations for various reasons, including the nation's own self-
interest;139 the nation's desire, as a liberal democracy, to respect the
rule of law;140 and because international norms have established
that it is appropriate for the United States to abide by its
international obligations.' 4 1 In other words, if the United States
does not abide by its international obligations, including those
owed to the WTO and its members, the United States may suffer
a variety of consequences, to its own reputation and to its ability
134 Appellate Body Report: Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, supra note 12 7, at
165.
135 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994).
136 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1).
137 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110, 103d Cong., at 7 (1994).
138 The principle pacta sunt servanda is related to this idea that the United
States must uphold its agreements. Pacta sunt servanda is the principle, codified
in some conventions, which states that promises must be upheld. See Richard
Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 407, 426
(1994).
139 Heath Pickering, Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?, E-
INT'L RELATIONS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-do-
states-mostly-obey-international-law/.
140 Id. (emphasizing that respect of the law is crucial in liberal democracies).
141 Id. (describing the phenomenon wherein, as certain behavior becomes
the accepted norm, more States are willing to abide by that newly formed norm).
130 Vol. 28:1
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to negotiate and be respected by other States.
The judiciary has repeatedly stated that complying with
international obligations is "strictly a matter for Congress." '142 In
fact, the judiciary cites the Constitution in finding that "'the
conduct of foreign relations is committed ... to the political
departments of the Federal Government.'1 143 Furthermore, since
the judiciary takes a deferential approach when reviewing DOC
actions, it will only overturn DOC methodologies and label them
impermissible if they do not abide by United States law. 144 More
recently, the judiciary has noted that the DOC may use zeroing
and similar methods because of the ambiguity in certain sections
of the Tariff Act of 1930.' By ridding the Tariff Act of 1930 of its
ambiguities in regard to dumping calculations, the DOC should no
longer have the discretion to use zeroing or differential pricing
analysis. Unfortunately, without Congress' action, the judiciary
will continue to defer to the DOC's ability to manipulate dumping
calculations. Nevertheless, the United States has repeatedly
expressed its intention to comply with WTO rulings, and revising
the Tariff Act of 1930 would mandate the compliance that the
United States intends.146
V. NECESSARY CHANGES TO THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930
The Tariff Act of 1930 includes many ambiguous sections
in regard to dumping calculations and antidumping duties. A few,
in particular, have allowed the DOC to continue to use zeroing and
differential pricing analyses, regardless of the dissatisfaction of the
WTO and WTO Member States. These ambiguous sections
include: Section 1677(35)(A); Section 1677(35)(B); and Section
1673e(a). Further, the lack of any strict prohibition on zeroing
negative margin transactions and the lack of consideration of all
"I Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2005). See also, Timken Co. v. U.S., 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Pesquera
Mares Australes Ltda. v. U.S., 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Suramerica de
Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. U.S., 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
143 Corus Staal BV, 395 F.3d at 1349 (quoting U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1942))..
144 Timken Co., 354 F.3d at 1340.
145 U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.3d at 1361.
146 Sunjoon Cho, No More Zeroing?: The United States Changes Its
Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO, 16 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS
8 (2012), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/8/no-more-
zeroing-united-states-changes-its-antidumping-policy-comply-wto.
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sales transactions is also troublesome.
A. Sections in Need of Revision
1. Sections 1677(35)(A) and 1677(35)(B)
Section 1677(35) generally covers both dumping margins
and weighted average dumping margins. 4 7 Section 1677(35)(A)
states: "[t]he term 'dumping margin' means the amount by which
the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export
price of the subject merchandise."'48 This section is incredibly
important because it defines dumping margin by implicitly
addressing how to construct the dumping margin. Section
167 7(35)(A) is problematic because it includes the word "exceeds"
in the dumping margin definition. 149 By explicitly stating that only
occasions where normal value exceeds the export price need to be
considered when constructing the dumping margin, the Act allows
the DOC to eliminate (zero out) any instances when the normal
value does not exceed the export price. This is precisely what the
DOC does when it zeroes, and the dumping margin definition in
section 1677(35)(A) allows the DOC to take that action.
The definitional language of section 1677(35)(B) is also in
need of revision. Section 1677(35)(B) currently states: "[t]he term
'weighted average dumping margin' is the percentage determined
by dividing the aggregate dumping margins determined for a
specific exporter or producer by the aggregate export prices and
constructed export prices of such exporter or producer.' °5 0 Section
167 7(35)(B) suffers a flaw due, in part, to the definitional language
of section 1677(35)(A). Since section 1677(35)(A), defining dumping
margin, does not require all instances when the normal value is
compared to the export price to be considered, 5 ' section
1677(35)(B) necessarily results in the same flaw: not all dumping
margins are considered, and thus, the weighted average dumping
margin is skewed in instances where zeroing occurs. Therefore, the
restrictive language of section 1677(35)(A) allows the DOC, when
considering section 1677(35)(B), to completely disregard negative
147 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35).
148 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A).
149 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A).
150 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B).
5' 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A). Only instances where the "normal value exceeds
the export price" need to be considered, as previously mentioned. Id.
Vol. 28:1
Int'l Trade's Zero Sum Game
dumping margins when it aggregates. In turn, this means that
aggregate dumping margins only consider positive dumping
margins.
2. Section 1673e(a)
Section 1673e(a) suffers from the same restrictive language
flaw of section 1677(35)(A). Section 1673e(a)(1) states that:
Within 7 days after being notified by the Commission of
an affirmative determination under section 1673d(b) of
this title, the administering authority shall publish an
antidumping duty order which- (1) directs customs
officers to assess an antidumping duty equal to the
amount by which the normal value of the merchandise
exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price)
of the merchandise, within 6 months after the date on
which the administering authority receives satisfactory
information upon which the assessment may be
based ...12
Unfortunately, the language of section 1673e(a) allows the DOC to
eliminate any instances in which the normal value does not exceed
the export price. This permission explicitly arises in section
1673e(a)(1). The only difference between sections 1677(35)(A) and
1673e(a) are when each section applies: section 1677(35)(A) applies
to all instances when the dumping margin is constructed, 153 and
section 1673e(a) applies to those instances when dumping and
injury (or potential injury) have been found by the DOC and ITC,
respectively, necessitating the issuance of an antidumping duty
order. 154
3. The Lack of Explicit Non-Zeroing Language
The Tariff Act does not include any language that prohibits
the zeroing of negative margin transactions. Since sections
1677(35)(A), 1677(35)(B) and 1673(e)(a) are ambiguous enough to
allow zeroing, given the exceeding language in each section, it
would be of tremendous benefit to the Act's clarity to explicitly
state that zeroing is prohibited. By doing this, Congress would
eliminate any ambiguity arising from section 1677(35)(A), section
152 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1).
153 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A).
154 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1).
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1677(35)(B), section 1673(e)(a), or like sections.
B. Revisions to be Made
1. Sections 1677(35)(A) and 1677(35)(B)
Both sections 1677(35)(A) and 1677(35)(B) can be simply
revised to eliminate ambiguity and disallow for zeroing actions.
For instance, to revise section 1677(35)(A), Congress needs only to
eliminate one word and add two words. Section 1677(35)(A) may
be revised to state: "The term 'dumping margin' means the
amount by which the normal value emeee&d differs from the export
price or constructed export price of the subject merchandise." By
deleting "exceeds" and inserting "differs from," the DOC is
instructed to consider any time the normal value differs from the
export price; in essence, any time the normal value and the export
price are not identical (which would result in a zero difference), the
DOC must consider the difference under this new construction of
section 1677(35)(A). This revision would eliminate the implicit
permission the DOC currently has to zero out any instances where
the dumping margin does not exceed the export price.
Further, section 1677(35)(B) needs only an eight-word
phrase to eliminate its ambiguity. Congress needs only to revise
1677(35)(B) to state: "The term 'weighted average dumping
margin' is the percentage determined by dividing the aggregate
dumping margins determined for a specific exporter or producer,
which are constructed by aggregating all dumping margins, by the
aggregate export prices and constructed export prices of such
exporter or producer." By adding language that requires all
dumping margins to be aggregated, both positive and negative
dumping margins will be considered, which eliminates the DOC's
opportunity to zero negative dumping margins. Section
1677(35)(B) does not necessarily need to be revised if section
1677(35)(A) is revised in the suggested manner. As previously
mentioned, section 1677(35)(A) is what provides section
1677(35)(B) with its ambiguity and restrictiveness. A revision to the
key problem-causing section, section 1677(35)(A), may make
revisions to section 1677(35)(B) unnecessary.
2. Section 1673e(a)
Since its issues are similar to those of section 1677(35)(A),
section 1673e(a) requires a very similar revision to that performed
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on section 1677(35)(A). In order to revise section 1673e(a) to
eliminate the possibility of zeroing, one word must be eliminated
and two words added in its place. The revised version of section
1673e(a)(1) would state: "Within 7 days after being notified by the
Commission of an affirmative determination under section
1673d(b) of this title, the administering authority shall publish an
antidumping duty order which--(1) directs customs officers to
assess an antidumping duty equal to the amount by which the
normal value of the merchandise differs from the export price (or
the constructed export price) of the merchandise, within 6 months
after the date on which the administering authority receives
satisfactory information upon which the assessment may be
based.. . ." By eliminating "exceeds" in section 1673e(a)(1) and
replacing the word with "differs from," the DOC cannot imply that
only instances in which the normal value exceeds the export price
can be considered; instead, the DOC would be instructed by statute
to consider any time that the normal value differs from the export
price.
3. An Explicit Zeroing Exclusion Provision
In some instances, the simplest way to avoid ambiguity is
to directly state that which is and is not permitted. In the case of
the Tariff Act of 1930, the Act could benefit from adding an explicit
provision that states that zeroing is not allowed. To supplement all
other changes mentioned, a zeroing prohibition section may be
added to the Tariff Act, which may read as follows: "The zeroing
of any negative dumping margins is forbidden. All differences
between the normal value and export price should be considered
when calculating dumping margins. Further, all dumping
margins, negative and positive, should be used when calculating
aggregate dumping margins and antidumping duty rates." This
added section would eviscerate any remaining ambiguity.
Congress must revise the Tariff Act of 1930 if the United
States truly desires to uphold its WTO obligations. By revising
sections 1677(35)(A), 1677(35)(B), and 1673e(a), the Tariff Act of
'1930 should be void of any ambiguity that would allow the DOC
to continue to zero via the differential pricing analysis. In addition,
by adding an explicit no-zeroing provision to the Tariff Act of
1930, the statute would be void of any ambiguity regarding the
allowance of zeroing.
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VI.CONCLUSION
Zeroing must go. The reasons to eliminate zeroing are two-
fold: to comply with the WTO and to promote a more competitive
domestic and global economy. Congress must take action to amend
the Tariff Act of 1930 to disallow zeroing. If Congress takes the
measures mentioned in Part V, the DOC will be unable to continue
its zeroing use. This stop means that the producers mentioned in
the introduction, including all those that use foreign intermediary
products, will be able to continue to grow their businesses because
they will no longer be subjected to inappropriate antidumping
duties. With the Tariff Act of 1930 amended to eliminate zeroing,
unnecessary dumping findings will cease. Terminating the DOC's
use of zeroing in all arenas means that the economy should thrive
as businesses continue to grow and expand to employ more people.
This, in turn, will develop to create a healthier, more competitive
market, throughout the United States and throughout the world.
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